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Abstract
We improve the flexibility in designing access structures of quantum stabilizer-based secret
sharing schemes for classical secrets, by introducing message randomization in their encod-
ing procedures. We generalize the Gilbert–Varshamov bound for deterministic encoding to
randomized encoding of classical secrets. We also provide an explicit example of a ramp
secret sharing scheme with which multiple symbols in its classical secret are revealed to an
intermediate set, and justify the necessity of incorporating strong security criterion of con-
ventional secret sharing. Finally, we propose an explicit construction of strongly secure ramp
secret sharing scheme by quantum stabilizers, which can support twice as large classical
secrets as the McEliece–Sarwate strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme of the same
share size and the access structure.
Keywords Secret sharing · Quantum error-correcting code · Gilbert–Varshamove bound ·
Strong security
Mathematics Subject Classification 94A62 · 81P70 · 94B65
1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a scheme to share a secret among multiple participants so that only qualified
sets of participants can reconstruct the secret, while forbidden sets have no information about
the secret [14,49,53]. A piece of information received by a participant is called a share. A
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set of participants that is neither qualified nor forbidden is said to be intermediate. If there is
no intermediate set, a secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect, otherwise said to be ramp
[5,54]. There is an upper bound on the size of secret for fixed size of shares, when secret
sharing is perfect. On the other hand, the size of secret can be arbitrarily large for fixed size
of shares in ramp schemes. In this paper we consider ramp schemes, in other words, we allow
intermediate sets of participants or shares.
Both secret and shares are traditionally classical information. There exists a close con-
nection between secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes [4,12,15,16,29,34,44].
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret sharing
schemes with quantum shares were proposed [13,20,23,25,51]. A connection between quan-
tum secret sharing and quantum error-correcting codes has been well-known for many
years [13,18,20,32,33,36,37,48,51]. Well-known classes of quantum error-correcting codes
are the CSS codes [11,52], the stabilizer codes [9,10,19] and their nonbinary generaliza-
tions [3,26,42].
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of interme-
diate sets and that of forbidden sets. When both secret and shares are classical information,
encoding of secrets to shares are almost always randomized, that is, for a fixed secret, shares
are randomly chosen from a set determined by the secret [14,49,53]. By message random-
ization we mean this kind of randomized encoding of secrets to shares. It was shown that
some randomness in encoders is indispensable with classical shares [6–8].
In contrast with classical shares, Gottesman [20, Theorem 3] proved that message
randomization does not offer any advantage when both secret and shares are quantum infor-
mation, and that use of unitary encoding of quantum secret to quantum shares is sufficient.
Probably because of Gottesman’s observation, secret sharing schemes based on quantum
error-correcting codes have not used message randomization, as far as this author knows.
In our previous research [38,40], we expressed secret sharing for classical secrets based on
quantum stabilizer codes by linear codes, and expressed qualified and forbidden sets in terms
of the linear codes associated with quantum stabilizers. By using that, we gave a Gilbert-
Varshamov-type existence condition of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and
proved that there exist infinitely many access structures that can be realized by quantum
stabilizer codes but cannot be realized by any classical information processing.
However, there are some drawbacks in our proposal [38,40]. For example, any n − 1
participants out of n participants can be made forbidden, for example, by Shamir’s scheme.
But such an access structure cannot be realized by [38,40]. The first goal of this paper is
to make the stabilizer-based secret sharing more flexible in designing access structures by
introducing message randomization in the encoding. In our previous proposal [38,40], shares
are deterministic functions of secrets. The proposed scheme in this paper includes [38,40] as
a special case.
Ordinary ramp schemes have the following security risk: Suppose that classical secret
is m = (m1, …, mk), and an intermediate set has (≥ 1) symbol of information about m.
Then that intermediate set sometimes knows mi explicitly for some i . This insecurity was
mentioned in [44,54]. Iwamoto and Yamamoto [24] explicitly constructed such an example
with classical secret and classical shares, and Zhang and Matsumoto [55] did with quantum
shares. In order to address this security risk, Yamamoto [54] introduced the notion of strong
security into ramp schemes: A secret sharing scheme with classical secret m = (m1, …,
mk) is said to be strongly secure [24] if any (k − ) symbols in m is always statistically
independent of shares in an intermediate set that has  symbol of information about m, for
 = 1,…, k−1. Recently Martínez-Peñas constructed communication efficient and strongly
secure ramp schemes with classical shares [35]. The second goal of this paper is to give an
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explicit construction of strongly secure ramp secret sharing for classical secrets based on
quantum stabilizer codes, by extending the previous construction [38,40].
Strong security concerns with secrecy of parts of a message. The secrecy of parts of
a message has also been studied for network coding [21,28,41,50] and wiretap channel
coding [22,27].
Note that, throughout in this paper, secrets are classical and shares are quantum. The value
added by randomization does not contradict with Gottesman’s observation [20, Theorem 3]
that focused on quantum secrets.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces necessary notations and proposes
randomized encoding for quantum stabilizer-based secret sharing. Section 3 clarifies the
access structure of the proposed scheme. Section 4 analyzes the amount of information leaked
to an intermediate set, which will be used for the strong security later. Section 5 generalizes
the Gilbert-Varshamov existential condition for secret sharing schemes from one given in
[38,40]. Section 6 introduces a strong security criterion and an explicit construction with
strong security based on Reed-Solomon codes. Then we compare the proposed construction
with the McEliece-Sarwate strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme [44].
2 Randomized encoding and its access structures
2.1 Preliminaries
Let A ⊂ {1, …, n} be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), A = {1, …, n} \ A,
and TrA the partial trace over A. For a density matrix ρ, col(ρ) denotes its column space.
When col(ρ1), …, col(ρn) are orthogonal to each other, that is, ρiρ j = 0 for i = j , we
can distinguish ρ1, …, ρn by a suitable projective measurement with probability 1. Since
density matrices are quantum generalization of probability distributions [45], the quantum
randomized encoding of a secret can be expressed as a density matrix.
Definition 1 [38,40] Let ρA(m) be the density matrix of shares in A encoded from a classical
secret m. We say A to be qualified if col(ρA(m))) and col(ρA(m′)) are orthogonal to each
other for different classical secrets m, m′. We say A to be forbidden if ρA(m) is the same
density matrix regardless of classical secret m. By an access structure we mean the set of
qualified sets and the set of forbidden sets.
Let p be a prime number, Fp the finite field with p elements, and Cp the p-dimensional
complex linear space. The quantum state space of n qudits is denoted by C⊗np with its
orthonormal basis {|v〉 : v ∈ Fnp}.
For two vectors a, b ∈ Fnp , denote by 〈a, b〉E the standard Euclidean inner product. For
two vectors (a|b) and (a′|b′) ∈ F2np , we define the standard symplectic inner product
〈(a|b), (a′|b′)〉s = 〈a,b′〉E − 〈a′,b〉E .
For an Fp-linear space CS ⊂ F2np , C⊥sS denotes its orthogonal space in F2np with respect
to 〈·, ·〉s . Throughout this paper we always assume dimCS = n − k − s and CS ⊆ C⊥sS .
We will use k to denote the number of symbols in classical secrets and s(≥ 0) to denote
amount of randomness in encoding. We also assume that we have CS ⊂ CR ⊆ C⊥sR and
dimCR = n − s.
Let X be the p × p complex unitary matrix defined by X |i〉 = |i + 1〉 for i ∈ Fp , and
Z the p × p complex unitary matrix defined by Z |i〉 = ωi |i〉, where ω is a primitive p-th
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root of 1 in the complex numbers. For (a|b) = (a1, …, an |b1, …, bn) ∈ F2np , define the
pn × pn complex unitary matrix X(a)Z(b) = Xa1 Zb1 ⊗· · ·⊗ Xan Zbn as defined in [26]. An
[[n, k + s]]p quantum stabilizer codes Q encoding k + s qudits into n qudits can be defined
as a simultaneous eigenspace of all X(a)Z(b) ((a|b) ∈ CS). Unlike [26] we do not require
the eigenvalue of Q to be one, which means that the eigenvalue of |ϕ〉 ∈ Q is not required
to be one for X(a)Z(b) ((a|b) ∈ CS).
2.2 Proposed randomized encoding
Witt’s Lemma [1], [2, Chapter 7] states that if there exist two subspaces V1, V2 ⊂ W and
their bijective linear map ι : V1 → V2 preserving symplectic inner products in V1, then there
always exists a symplectic isometry κ : W → W , that is, a bijective linear map preserving
the symplectic inner products in W , such that the restriction of κ to V1 is ι. Let W = F2np ,
V1 = CR, V2 = {(a1,…, an−s , 0,…, 0|0,…, 0)|ai ∈ Fp , i = 1,…, n−s}, and Vmax = {(a1,
…, an |0, …, 0)|ai ∈ Fp , i = 1, …, n}. Then there exists a bijective linear map ι : V1 → V2
satisfying the assumptions inWitt’s Lemma and we also have V⊥smax = Vmax. Let κ : W → W
as implied by Witt’s Lemma, and Cmax = κ−1(Vmax). We have CS ⊆ CR ⊆ Cmax ⊆ C⊥sR ⊆
C⊥sS with Cmax = C⊥smax. Note that Cmax is not unique and usually there are many possible
choices of Cmax. We have dimCmax = n and have an isomorphism f : Fkp → C⊥sS /C⊥sR as
linear spaces without inner products. SinceCmax = C⊥smax,Cmax defines an [[n, 0]]p quantum
stabilizer code Q0. Without loss of generality we may assume Q0 ⊂ Q. Let |ϕ〉 ∈ Q0 be a
quantum state vector. SinceCmax = C⊥smax, for a coset V ∈ C⊥sS /Cmax and (a|b), (a′|b′) ∈ V ,
X(a)Z(b)|ϕ〉 and X(a′)Z(b′)|ϕ〉 differ by a constant multiple in C and physically express
the same quantum state in Q. By an abuse of notation, for a coset V ∈ C⊥sS /Cmax we will
write |Vϕ〉 to mean X(a)Z(b)|ϕ〉 ((a|b) ∈ V ).
For a given classical secret m ∈ Fkp , we consider the following secret sharing scheme
with n participants:
1. f (m) is a coset of C⊥sS /C⊥sR and f (m) can also seen as a subset of C⊥sS /Cmax. Choose
V ∈ f (m) ⊂ C⊥sS /Cmax uniformly at random. Prepare the quantum codeword |Vϕ〉 ∈ Q
that corresponds to the classical secretm.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword |Vϕ〉 to a participant.






Remark 2 The encoding procedure in [38,40] corresponds to the special case CR = Cmax =
C⊥sR and s = 0 in the above proposed scheme.
Example 3 Let p = 3, n = 4, k = s = 2. A basis of the doubly-extended [4, 2, 3]3 Reed-
Solomon code over F3 consists of
v1 = (1, 1, 1, 0),
v2 = (0, 1, 2, 1).
By using them, we define CS = {0}, CR as the linear space spanned by {(v1|0), (0|v1)}, and
Cmax as the linear space spanned by {(v1|0), (v2|0), (0|v1), (0|v2)}. Let
v3 = (0, 1, 1, 0).
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Then C⊥sR is spanned by Cmax ∪ {(v3|0), (0|v3)}. Let
v4 = (0, 0, 0, 1).
C⊥sS = F83 and we can use {(v4|0) + C⊥sR , (0|v4) + C⊥sR } as a basis of C⊥sS /C⊥sR .
For a given secret (m1,m2) ∈ F23, the proposed encoder chooses a vector uniformly at
random from the set
(0, 0, 0,m1|0, 0, 0,m2) + C⊥sR ⊂ F83.
Since |C⊥sR | = 36, for fixed (m1,m2) the number of possible choices is 36. But since |ϕ〉 is an
eigenvector of all unitary matrices corresponding to a vector in Cmax, for fixed (m1,m2) the
number of possible quantum states is |C⊥sR /Cmax| = 32. The encoded shares X(a)Z(b)|ϕ〉
consist of 4 qudits in C3. Each quantum share in C3 is distributed to each participant.
3 Necessary and sufficient conditions on qualified and forbidden sets
Let A ⊂ {1, …, n}. Define FAp = {(a1, …, an |b1, …, bn) ∈ F2np : (ai , bi ) = 0 for i /∈ A}.
Let PA to be the projection map onto A, that is, PA(a1, …, an |b1, …, bn) = (ai |bi )i∈A.
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Sect. 2, A is qualified if and only if
dimCR/CS = dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp . (1)
A is forbidden if and only if
0 = dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp . (2)
Remark 5 The encoding procedure depends on the choice ofCmax = C⊥smax but by Theorem 4
we see that the access structure is independent of that choice.
Proof (Theorem 4)AssumeEq. (1). Then there exists a basis {(a1|b1)+CS,…, (ak |bk)+CS}
of CR/CS such that (ai |bi ) ∈ FAp . Any two vectors in a coset V ∈ C⊥sS /C⊥sR have the
same value of the symplectic inner product against a fixed (ai |bi ), which will be denoted
by 〈(ai |bi ), V 〉s . Suppose that we have two different cosets V1, V2 ∈ C⊥sS /C⊥sR , and that〈(ai |bi ), V1〉s = 〈(ai |bi ), V2〉s for all i . It means that V1 − V2 = C⊥sR is zero in C⊥sS /C⊥sR ,
a contradiction. We have seen that any two different cosets have different symplectic inner
product values against some (ai |bi ). For each i , the n participants can collectively perform
a quantum projective measurement corresponding to the eigenspaces of X(ai )Z(bi ) and
can determine the symplectic inner product1 〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s as [26, Lemma 5] when the
classical secret ism. Since (ai |bi ) has nonzero components only at A, the abovemeasurement
can be done only by A, which means A can reconstructm.
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of CS in FAp is isomorphic to
PA(C⊥sS ), which is reminiscent of the duality between shortened linear codes and punctured
linear codes [47], we see that dim PA(C⊥sS )/PA(C⊥sR ) < dimC⊥sS /C⊥sR . This means that
there exist two different classical secrets m1 and m2 such that PA( f (m1)) = PA( f (m2)).
Thismeans that the encoding procedures ofm1 andm2 are exactly the same on A and produce
the same density matrix on A, which shows that A is not qualified.
1 If we assume a non-prime finite field Fq as our base field, then the quantum measurement outcome just
determines [26, Lemma 5] Trq/p(〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s ) in place of 〈(ai |bi ), f (m)〉s , where Trq/p is the trace
map from Fq to its prime subfield Fp . Assuming a non-prime field Fq significantly complicates the proofs of
Theorem 4 and Lemma 8. So we assume a prime finite field until Remark 14.
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Assume Eq. (2). Then we have dim PA(C⊥sS )/PA(C⊥sR ) = 0. This means that for all
classical secrets m, PA( f (m)) and their encoding procedures on A are the same, which
produces the same density matrix on A regardless ofm. This shows that A is forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then there exist two different classical secrets m1, m2, and
(a|b) ∈ CR ∩ FAp \ CS ∩ FAp such that
〈(a|b), f (m1)〉s = 〈(a|b), f (m2)〉s .
By [26, Lemma 5], this means that the quantum measurement corresponding to X(a)Z(b)
gives different outcomeswith TrA(ρ(m1)) and TrA(ρ(m2)). Since (a|b) ∈ FAp , measurement
of X(a)Z(b) can be performed only by participants in A. These observations show that A is
not forbidden. 
Next we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [16] or the first relative
generalized Hamming weight [30]. To do so, we have to slightly modify them. For (a|b) =
(a1,…, an |b1,…, bn) ∈ Fnp , define its symplectic weight swt(a|b) = |{i : (ai , bi ) = (0, 0)}|.
For V2 ⊂ V1 ⊂ F2np , we define their coset distance as ds(V1, V2) = min{swt(a|b) : (a|b) ∈
V1 \ V2}.
Theorem 6 If |A| ≤ ds(CR,CS) − 1 then A is forbidden. If |A| ≥ n − ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) + 1
then A is qualified.
Example 7 Notations remain the same as Example 3. We have ds(CR,CS) = 3 and
ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) = 1. By Theorem 6, we know that two or less participants are forbidden
and all the participants are qualified.
Proof (Theorem 6) If |A| ≤ ds(CR,CS) − 1 then there is no (a|b) ∈ CR ∩ FAp \ CS ∩ FAp
and Eq. (2) holds.
Assume that |A| ≥ n − ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) + 1, or equivalently, |A| ≤ ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) − 1. We
have C⊥sS ∩ FAp = C⊥sR ∩ FAp . We also have FAp = ker(PA), which means dim PA(C⊥sS ) −
dim PA(C⊥sR ) = dimC⊥sS − dimC⊥sR = k. Since dimCR ∩ FAp − dimCS ∩ FAp =
dim PA(C⊥sS ) − dim PA(C⊥sR ) = k, we see that Eq. (1) holds with A. 
4 Amount of information possessed by an intermediate set
Let A ⊂ {1, …, n} with A = ∅ and A = {1, …, n}. In this section we study the amount of
information possessed by A.
Because the result f (m) of mapping f is an element inC⊥sS /C⊥sR , any two vectors (a1|b1)
and (a2|b2) ∈ f (m) give the same symplectic inner product values with any (a3|b3) ∈ CR.
Lemma 8 For two classical secrets m1 andm2, we have
– TrA(ρ(m1)) = TrA(ρ(m2)) if and only if f (m1) and f (m2) give the same symplectic
inner product for all vectors in CR ∩ FAp , and
– col(TrA(ρ(m1))) and col(TrA(ρ(m2))) are orthogonal to each other if and only if f (m1)
and f (m2) give different symplectic inner products for some vector (a|b) in CR ∩ FAp .
Proof Assume that f (m1) and f (m2) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors
in CR ∩ FAp . Then we have {PA(a|b) + PA(C⊥sR ) : (a|b) + C⊥sR ∈ f (m1)} = {PA(a|b) +
PA(C⊥sR ) : (a|b)+C⊥sR ∈ f (m2)}, and the encoding procedure on A is the same form1 and
m2, which shows TrA(ρ(m1)) = TrA(ρ(m2)).
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Assume that f (m1) and f (m2) give different symplectic inner product values for some
vector (a|b) in CR ∩ FAp . Then the quantum measurement corresponding to X(a)Z(b)
can be performed only by the participants in A and by [26, Lemma 5] the outcomes for
ρ(m1) and ρ( f (m2)) are different with probability 1. This means that col(TrA(ρ(m1))) and
col(TrA(ρ(m2))) are orthogonal to each other. 
Proposition 9 If dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp = , then the number of density matrices in  =
{TrA(ρ(m)) : m ∈ Fkp} is p.
For a fixed density matrix ρ ∈ , the number of classical secrets m such that ρ =
TrA(ρ(m)) is exactly p
k−.
Proof If PA(u1|v1)+ PA(C⊥sR ) = PA(u2|v2)+ PA(C⊥sR ) for (ui |vi ) ∈ f (mi )with classical
secrets mi (i = 1, 2), then by Lemma 8 col(TrA(ρ(m1))) and col(TrA(ρ(m2))) are orthog-
onal. By the assumption, we have dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp = dim PA(C⊥sS )/PA(C⊥sR ) = .
There are p elements in PA(C⊥s)/PA(Cmax), which shows the first claim.
The composite Fp-linear map “mod PA(C⊥sR )” ◦PA ◦ f from Fkp to PA(C⊥sS )/PA(C⊥sR )
is surjective. Thus the dimension of its kernel is k − , which shows the second claim. 
Definition 10 In light of Proposition 9, the amount of information possessed by a set A of
participants is defined as
(log2 p) × dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp = (log2 p) × dim PA(C⊥sS )/PA(C⊥sR ). (3)
Remark 11 When the probability distribution of classical secretsm is uniform, the quantity in
Definition 10 is equal to the Holevo information [45, Sect. 12.1.1] betweenm and TrA(ρ(m))
by the same reason as [40, Remark 14].
We say that a secret sharing scheme is ri -reconstructible if |A| ≥ ri implies A has i log2 p
or more bits of information [17]. We say that a secret sharing scheme is ti -private if |A| ≤ ti
implies A has less than i log2 p bits of information [17]. In order to express ri and ti in
terms of combinatorial properties of C , we review a slightly modified version of the relative
generalized Hamming weight [30].
Definition 12 [40] For two linear spaces V2 ⊂ V1 ⊂ F2np and i = 1, …, k, define the i-th
relative generalized symplectic weight
dis(V1, V2) = min{|A| : dim FAp ∩ V1 − dim FAp ∩ V2 ≥ i}. (4)
Note that d1s = ds . The following theorem generalizes Theorem 6.
Theorem 13
ti ≥ dis(CR,CS) − 1,
rk+1−i ≤ n − dis(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) + 1.
Proof The following proof is almost the same as [40, Theorem 16]. Assume that |A| ≤ ti .
By definition of dis , dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp ≤ i − 1, which shows the first claim.
Assume that |A| ≥ ri . Then |A| ≤ dis(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR )−1, which implies dimC⊥sS ∩FAp /C⊥sR ∩
FAp ≤ i − 1. The last inequality implies dimCR ∩ FAp /CS ∩ FAp ≥ k − i + 1, which shows
the second claim. 
Remark 14 Here we have considered only the case of prime fields. Theorems 4, 6, 13, Propo-
sition 9 and Definition 10 can be generalized to arbitrary finite fields, similarly to what has
been done in [40, Sect. 5.1].
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5 Gilbert–Varshamov-type existential condition
Let q be some prime power. In this section, we give a sufficient condition (5) for existence
of CS ⊂ CR ⊆ C⊥sR ⊂ C⊥sS ⊂ F2nq , with given parameters.


















(q2 − 1)i < 1, (5)
then there exist CS and CR such that CS ⊂ CR ⊆ C⊥sR ⊂ C⊥sS ⊂ F2nq , dimCS = n − k − s,
dimCR = n − s ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) ≥ δr and ds(CR,CS) ≥ δt .
Proof The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert-Varshamov bound for sta-
bilizer codes [9] and also to [40]. Let Sp(q, n) be the set of symplectic isometries on F2nq ,
that is, bijective linear maps preserving the values of the symplectic inner product. Let A(k)
be the set of pairs of linear spaces (V ,W ) such that dim V = n − k − s, dimW = n − s
and V ⊂ W ⊆ W⊥s ⊂ V⊥s ⊂ F2nq . For e ∈ F2nq , define BV (k, e) = {(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e ∈
V⊥s \ W⊥s} and BW (k, e) = {(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e ∈ W \ V }.
For nonzero e1 , e2 ∈ F2nq , we have |BW (k, e1)| = |BW (k, e2)|, whose proof is the same
argument as [40, Proof of Theorem 25], and reproduced below: For nonzero e1 , e2 ∈ F2nq
with M1e1 = e2 (M1 ∈ Sp(q, n)) and some fixed (V1,W1) ∈ A(k), we have
|BW (k, e1)|
= |{(v,W ) ∈ A(k) : e1 ∈ W \ V }|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : e1 ∈ MW \ MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(M−11 MV1, M−11 MW1) : e1 ∈ M−11 MW \ M−11 MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : M1e1 ∈ MW \ MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(MV1, MW1) : e2 ∈ MW \ MV , M ∈ Sp(q, n)}|
= |{(V ,W ) ∈ A(k) : e2 ∈ W \ V }|
= |BW (k, e2)|.
By a similar argument we also have |BV (k, e1)| = |BV (k, e2)|.
For each (V ,W ) ∈ A(k), the number of e such that e ∈ W \ V is |W | − |V | = qn−s −
qn−k−s . The number of triples (e, V , W ) such that 0 = e ∈ W \ V is
∑
0 =e∈F2nq










q2n − 1 . (7)
If there exists (V ,W ) ∈ A(k) such that (V ,W ) /∈ BV (k, e1) and (V ,W ) /∈ BV (k, e2) for
all 1 ≤ swt(e1) ≤ δr − 1 and 1 ≤ swt(e2) ≤ δt − 1 then there exists a pair of (V ,W ) with
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(q2 − 1)i . (8)
By combining Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) we see that Eq. (5) is a sufficient condition for ensuring
the existence of (V ,W ) required in Theorem 15. 
We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 15.
Theorem 16 Let R ≤ 1, S ≤ 1, εt < 0.5 and εr < 0.5 be nonnegative real numbers. Define
hq(x) = −x logq x − (1 − x) logq(1 − x). For sufficiently large n, if
hq(εt ) + εt logq(q2 − 1) < 1 + S and
hq(εr ) + εr logq(q2 − 1) < 1 − R − S,
then there exist CS and CR such that CS ⊂ CR ⊆ C⊥sR ⊂ C⊥sS ⊂ F2nq , dimCS = n−n(R+
S), dimCR = n − nS ds(C⊥sS ,C⊥sR ) ≥ nεr and ds(CR,CS) ≥ nεt.




























Note that we can find
(n
i
) ≤ expq [hq(i/n)] for i < n/2 in [31].
When the assumption of Theorem 16 holds, by Eq. (9) we see that logq [ left hand side of
Eq. (5) ]/n goes to a negative value, noting that limn→∞ logq (δ−1)n = 0. This concludes the
proof. 
In [40, Theorem 26] we proved a special case S = 0 of Theorem 16. The new parameter
S ≥ 0 provides larger flexibility.
6 Strong security
Let n = q , and let k, n − s − k be nonnegative even integers. The field size q can be either
odd or even. We will consider the case that the number of participants is smaller than q in
Remark 21. Let α1, …, αn ∈ Fq be n distinct elements. Define an [n, k] Reed-Solomon (RS)
code as
RS(n, k) = {(g(α1), . . . , g(αn)) : g(x) ∈ Fq [x], deg g(x) < k}.




In order to justify our study of strong security, we will show an insecure ramp scheme
constructed in the framework of [38,40]. Assume that n = q are even integers only in
Sect. 6.1. Let CS = {0}, s = 0, k = n, and CR = Cmax = C⊥sR = RS(n, n/2) ×RS(n, n/2).
For classical secret m = (m1, …, mn), let h1(x) = m1xn/2 + · · · + mn/2xn−1 and h2(x) =
m1+n/2xn/2 + · · · + mnxn−1. Define an Fq -linear map f : Fnq → C⊥sS /C⊥sR in Sect. 2.2 as
f (m) = (h1(α1), . . . , h1(αn)|h2(α1), . . . , h2(αn)) + C⊥sR .
As shown in [38,40, Sect. 5.4], any n−1 shares have (n−2) log2 q bits of information about
m. Assume αn = 0. The participant set A = {1, …, n − 1} can perform a measurement
corresponding to a nonzero vector in CR ∩ FAq , which contains (ui |0) and (0|ui ) for i = 1,
…, n/2 − 1, where u = (αi1, …, αin−1, αin = 0). We have
〈(ui |0), (h1(α1), . . . , h1(αn)|h2(α1), . . . , h2(αn))〉s = mn−i ,
〈(0|ui ), (h1(α1), . . . , h1(αn)|h2(α1), . . . , h2(αn))〉s = −mn/2−i−1.
By [26, Lemma 5], the share set A = {1, …, n−1} can completely determine n−2 symbols
m1, …, mn/2−2, mn/2, …, mn/2−1 in the classical secret m. In the next subsection, we will
show a remedy to address this kind of insecurity.
6.2 Definition and construction of strongly secure schemes
Definition 17 Let A ⊂ {1, …, n} be a share set and ρA the density matrix of shares in
A. Let m ∈ Fkq be a classical secret drawn from the uniform probability distribution on
Fkq . Let Z ⊂ {1, …, k/2}. A quantum ramp secret sharing scheme is said to be strongly
secure if I (m; ρA) =  log2 q > 0 then I (PZ∪k/2+Z (m); ρA) = 0 for all Z with 2|Z | ≤
k − , where I (·; ·) denotes the Holevo information [45, Section 12.1.1] counted in log2,
k/2+ Z = {k/2+ z : z ∈ Z} and PZ∪k/2+Z is previously defined projection to an index set
Z ∪ k/2 + Z ⊂ {1, …, k}.
The above definition is a straightforward generalization of [24, Definition 6] to the quantum
setting, with regarding (mi ,mi+k/2) ∈ F2q as one symbol and the secretm consisting of k/2
such symbols.
In this subsection, we will construct a scheme distributing a classical secret consisting of
k symbols in Fq to n participants with 1 qudit of dimension q , so that any (n + k + s)/2
participants can reconstruct the secret, while any (n + s)/2 or less participants have no
information about the secret, with the above strong security. We note that a somewhat similar
idea was used for construction of a strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme with classical
shares [39].
We assume that α1, …, αk/2 are nonzero. Define
CS = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n − k − s)/2)},
CR = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n − s)/2)}.
123
Randomized quantum secret sharing... 1903
Then we can easily see that
C⊥sR = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n + s)/2)},
C⊥sS = {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n + k + s)/2)},
dimCS = n − k − s,
dimCR = n − s.
We can choose Cmax as, for example,
Cmax = {(a|b) : a ∈ RS(n, n/2),b ∈ RS(n, n/2)}.
For a classical secret m = (m1, …, mk) ∈ Fkq , find g1(x) = a0x0 + · · · + ak/2−1xk/2−1
and g2(x) = b0x0 + · · · + bk/2−1xk/2−1 such that g1(α j ) = m j/α(n+s)/2j and g2(α j ) =
m j+k/2/α(n+s)/2j for all j = 1, …, k/2. Such g1(x) and g2(x) always exist because compu-
tation of gi (x) is just the inverse mapping of the encoding of RS(k/2, k/2) for the codeword
(m1/α
(n+s)/2
1 , …, mk/2/α
(n+s)/2
k/2 ). Let g3(x) = x (n+s)/2g1(x) and g4(x) = x (n+s)/2g2(x).
Observe that g3(α j ) = m j and g4(α j ) = mk/2+ j . Define a bijective Fq -linear map f as
f (m) = (g3(α1), . . . , g3(αn)|g4(α1), . . . , g4(αn)) + C⊥sR ∈ C⊥sS /C⊥sR .
The quantum shares are computed as in Sect. 2.2 with the above f . For A ⊂ {1, …, n},
let ρA be the density matrix of quantum shares in A. By almost the same argument as [40,
Sect. 5.4], we see that the Holevo information I (m; ρA) between m and ρA is










2 ≤ |A| ≤ n+k+s2 ,
k log2 q if
n+k+s
2 ≤ |A| ≤ n.
(10)
In particular, the above means that A is qualified if and only if |A| ≥ (n + k + s)/2 and A is
forbidden if and only if |A| ≤ (n + s)/2.
Let B ⊂ {1, …, k}. By slight abuse of notation, by PB(m) we mean (mi )i∈B . In order
to verify the strong security, we have to compute the Holevo information I (PB(m); ρA). In
order to compute I (PB(m); ρA), we consider the following related problem. Let B = {1,…,
k} \ B. When we consider the strong security of PB(m), the rest PB(m) serves as dummy
variable to hide PB(m).
Let B ′ ⊂ {1, …, k/2} and B ′ = {1, …, k/2} \ B ′. For g(x) = a0x0 +
· · · a(n+k+s)/2−1−|B′|x (n+k+s)/2−1−|B′|, define gB′(x) = a(n+k+s)/2−|B′|x (n+k+s)/2−|B′| +




j for j ∈ B ′.
Such a gB′(x) is uniquely determined because it is the inverse of encoding of [|B ′|, |B ′|]
generalized Reed-Solomon code. Define a linear code
DB′ = {(g(α1) + gB′(α1), . . . , g(αn) + gB′(αn)) : deg g(x) ≤ (n + k + s)/2 − 1 − |B ′|}.
For a subset S ⊂ Fnq , by abuse of notation we mean PA(S) = {(xi )i∈A : (x1, …, xn) ∈ S}.
Lemma 18 Assume |B ′| < k/2.





0 if 0 ≤ |A| ≤ n+k+s2 − |B ′|,(|A| + |B ′| − n+k+s2
)




Proof Since the minimum Hamming distance of RS(n, (n + k + s)/2) is (n − k − s)/2+ 1,
we have [47]
dim PA(RS(n, (n + k + s)/2)) =




2 ≤ |A| ≤ n.
(12)
The codeword in DB′ is the sum of a codeword in RS(n, (n + k + s)/2 − |B ′|) and the
codeword defined by gB′(x). The latter can be seen as a codeword in a generalized Reed-
Solomon code of length n and dimension |B ′|. So, the Hamming weight of a codeword
defined by gB′(x) is ≥ n + 1− |B ′|. There exists a codeword in RS(n, (n + k + s)/2− |B ′|)
of Hamming weight (n − k − s)/2 + 1 + |B ′|. Since |B ′| < k/2, the condition k − s ≤ n
implies n + 1− |B ′| > (n − k − s)/2+ 1+ |B ′|. Under this condition, the minimum weight
codeword in RS(n, (n + k + s)/2 − |B ′|) cannot be canceled by a codeword defined by
gB′(x). Therefore, the minimum Hamming distance of DB′ is (n − k − s)/2 + 1 + |B ′|,
which, by [47], implies
dim PA(DB′) =
{ |A| if 0 ≤ |A| ≤ (n + k + s)/2 − |B ′|,
(n + k + s)/2 − |B ′| if (n + k + s)/2 − |B ′| ≤ |A| ≤ n. (13)
Combining Eqs. (12) and (13) gives the claim of this lemma. 





0 if 0 ≤ a ≤ n+k+s2 − b,(
a + b − n+k+s2
)
if n+k+s2 − b ≤ a ≤ n+k+s2 ,
b if n+k+s2 ≤ a ≤ n.
Proposition 19 Let B1 = B ∩ {1, . . . , k/2} and B2 = B ∩ {1 + k/2, . . . , k}
I (PB(m); ρA) = [(|A|, |B1|) + (|A|, |B2|)] log2 q
Proof Let B = {1, …, k} \ B. When we see PB(m) as secret and PB(m) as meaningless
dummy randomness, the corresponding secret sharing scheme is described byC⊥sS ⊃ C ′⊥sR ⊃
C ′R ⊃ CS, where C ′⊥sR corresponds to C⊥sR in Sect. 2.2, and
C ′⊥sR = {(a|b) : a ∈ DB1 ,b ∈ DB2}
In order to evaluate I (PB(m); ρA), we have to compute dimC ′R ∩ FAq /CS ∩ FAq , which is
equal to dim PA(C⊥sS ) − dim PA(C ′⊥sR ). By Lemma 18 we have
dim PA(C
⊥s
S ) − dim PA(C ′⊥sR ) = (|A|, |B1|) + (|A|, |B2|),
which completes the proof. 
Corollary 20 The proposed encoding scheme is strongly secure in the sense of Definition 17.
Proof Assume I (m; ρA) =  log2 q > 0. Then, by Eq. (10) |A| = +n+s2 , or equivalently,
 = 2|A| − n − s. Assume 2|Z | ≤ k − . Then |A| ≤ n+k+s2 − |Z |. Application of
Proposition 19 with |B1| = |B2| = |Z | shows I (PZ∪k/2+Z (m); ρA) = 0. 
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Remark 21 Although we have assumed n = q , we note that the number n′ of participants
can be made smaller than q by discarding shares, whose access structure is the same as
CS = FAq ∩ {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n − k − s)/2)},
CR = FAq ∩ {(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n − s)/2)},
C⊥sR = PA({(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n + s)/2)}),
C⊥sS = PA({(a|b) : a,b ∈ RS(n, (n + k + s)/2)}),
where A ⊂ {1, …, n} with |A| = n′.
6.3 Comparison with theMcEliece–Sarwate scheme
McEliece and Sarwate [44] proposed the first strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme,
whose strong security was proved much later [46]. Let α1, …, αn+k be distinct elements in
Fq . For a given secret (m1, …, mk) ∈ Fkq , randomly choose a polynomial g(x) of degree
less than (n + k + s)/2 such that g(αi ) = mi for i = 1, …, k. Then it distributes g(αk+i ) to
the i-th participant. Any (n + k + s)/2 or more participants can reconstruct the secret. Any
(n−k+s)/2 or less participants have no information about the secret. Thus the qualified sets
are the same, but theMcEliece–Sarwate scheme has smaller forbidden sets than the proposed
one in Sect. 6.2. Equivalently, the classical secret in the proposed construction can be twice
as large as the McEliece-Sarwate scheme for the same qualified sets and the same forbidden
sets. In addition, the McEliece-Sarwate scheme can support at most q − k participants, while
the proposed one in Sect. 6.2 can support at most q participants.
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